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Nittinger v. Holman, 69 P.3d 688 (Nev. 2003).1 
 
CORPORATE LAW – PUNITIVE DAMAGES – TORT – AGENCY 
 
Summary 
 
Respondents, Dedric Holman and Christina Edwards, were gambling at the Gold 
Coast Hotel when a physical confrontation arose between John Nittinger, a security 
guard, and Holman.  When Holman tried to run, security officers pursued him and held 
him to the ground.  According to Holman’s testimony, the guards made racial slurs, 
punched, kicked and beat him.  The security shift supervisor was present during part of 
the incident.  The district court instructed the jury that it could find the Gold Coast liable 
for punitive damages if a “managerial agent” authorized or ratified the guards’ conduct.  
The jury awarded respondents $198,000 in compensatory damages from the security 
guards and the Gold Coast.  The jury also awarded the respondents $371,000 in punitive 
damages from the Gold Coast. 
On appeal, appellant Gold Coast argued that because the security shift supervisor 
was not a managerial agent, it could not be liable for punitive damages.  The Nevada 
Supreme Court agreed, therefore reversing the imposition of punitive damages on the 
Gold Coast. 
 
Issue and Disposition  
 
Issue 
 
Is a corporation is liable for punitive damages based on the actions of its 
employee when the employee is a supervisor? 
 
Disposition 
 
Yes, but a corporation is only liable for punitive damages based on its employees 
actions when the employee is a managerial agent of the corporation.  The fact that an 
employee is a supervisor is not enough to establish that the employee is a managerial 
agent.  An employee is considered a managerial agent of a corporation if he or she has 
control, discretion and independent judgment over a certain area of the corporation with 
the power to set policy for the corporation. 
 
Commentary 
 
State of the Law Before Nittinger 
 
Prior to Nittinger, the Supreme Court of Nevada adopted the punitive damages 
standard set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.2  Under section 909 of the 
Restatement of Torts, punitive damages can be awarded against a master or other 
                                                          
1  By Cami Perkins 
 2 
principal because of an act by an agent only if the corporation or managerial agent of the 
corporation ratified or approved the act.3 
In Bellegarde, the court determined that the Restatement approach, otherwise 
known as the “complicity theory,” strikes the appropriate balance between protecting the 
public and ensuring that punitive damages are awarded “because of an employer’s own 
wrongful conduct.”4  The defendant corporation in Bellegarde employed a store manager 
who supervised store security guards while they tortiously mistreated a suspected 
shoplifter.5  In upholding the jury’s punitive damage award against the corporation, the 
court looked at what the manager was authorized to do by the corporation and whether 
the manager had discretion as to what was done and how it was done.6 
The Bellegarde court established a guideline for determining whether an agent is 
acting in a managerial capacity by stating, “[The key] is to look to what the individual is 
authorized to do by the principal and to whether the agent has discretion as to what is 
done and how it is done.  Job titles . . . should be of little importance.”7 
Because the manager in Bellegarde lacked training, was unaware of any policies 
or guidelines regarding shoplifters, and was given the discretion to determine “what is 
done and how it is done,” it was reasonable to conclude that the store manager was a 
“managerial agent” and that she ratified or approved the acts of the security guards.8 
 
Effect of Nittinger on Current Law 
 
In Nittinger, the court applied the rule it previously pronounced in Bellegarde, but 
construed the meaning of “managerial agent” narrowly.  The fact that the security 
supervisor was a supervisor is not enough to grant him the status of a “managerial agent.”  
In considering who qualifies as a managerial agent, the court placed particular emphasis 
on the discretion or policy-making authority that the corporation granted the supervisor.  
The court reasoned that “the critical inquiry is the degree of discretion the employees 
possess in making decisions that will ultimately determine corporate policy.”9  Relying 
on its holding from Bellegarde, Supreme Court opinions from California, New Mexico, 
and the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, the Nevada Supreme Court articulated the criteria 
for charging an employer with punitive liability for the conduct of a managerial agent: 
“The managerial agent must be of sufficient stature and authority to have some control 
and discretion and independent judgment over a certain area of the business with some 
power to set policy for the company.”10 
Of particular importance was the fact that the Gold Coast had a progressive-force 
policy and charged the security supervisor with the responsibility of implementing the 
policy.  There was no evidence that the security supervisor had the authority to deviate 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2  See Smith’s Food & Drug Centers, Inc., v. Bellegarde, 114 Nev. 602, 958 P.2d 1208 (1998). 
3  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979). 
4  Smith’s Food & Drug Centers, 114 Nev. at 611. 
5  Id. at 604. 
6  Id. at 611. 
7  Id. 
8  Id. 
9  See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 148 (Cal. 1979). 
10  See Steinhoff v. Upriver Rest. Joint Venture, 177 F. Supp. 2d 598, 604-05 (E.D. Ky. 2000) (quoting 
Fitzgerald v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 46 F.3d 1034, 1045 n.24 (10th Cir. 1995). 
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from the established policy or that he had discretion or could exercise his independent 
judgment.  Rather, the supervisor only had authority to implement the corporation’s 
policy and ensure that the guards enforced it.  Therefore, the court’s holding limited a 
corporation’s scope of liability for the actions of its employees, including supervisors, by 
narrowing the meaning of the term “managerial agent.” 
 
Unanswered Questions 
 
Even though the court determined that an employee must have control, discretion 
and independent judgment to qualify as a “managerial agent,” the court did not explain 
how much control, discretion or judgment is necessary.  The court discussed the 
importance of the employee’s “power to set policy for the company,” but did not define 
how much power is necessary or what type of policies are sufficient.  One could argue 
that every employee, regardless of position or stature, is influential in setting policy for 
the company.  Additionally, there are few management or supervisory positions that do 
not entail discretion or independent judgment at some point.  The court did not indicate 
whether punitive damages could be awarded against a corporation under such 
circumstances.  Finally, while the court noted the importance of the Gold Coast’s 
“established” progressive-force policy, the court did not state whether a particular policy 
was necessary and if so, how “established” the policy must be. 
 
Survey of the Law in Other Jurisdictions  
 
The court’s conclusion is well-supported by holdings in other jurisdictions.  
However, as the dissent stated, there are certainly courts that have interpreted the term 
“managerial agent” to include employees who manage or are in supervisory positions and 
are charged with enforcing a corporation’s rules and policies.11 
In Albuquerque Concrete, the New Mexico Supreme Court explained that in 
today’s corporate world, corporate control must be delegated to managing agents, who 
may not possess the level of authority that was traditionally considered necessary to 
trigger imposing punitive damages on the corporation.12  The New Mexico Court 
reasoned that if misconduct by managing agents who control daily operations is not 
sufficient to trigger corporate liability for punitive damages, large corporations could 
unfairly escape liability for punitive damages.13  Therefore, although well-supported, the 
court’s holding is not uniform among all jurisdictions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Corporations are not liable for punitive damages based on the actions of its 
employees unless the employee is a “managerial agent” of the corporation.  The fact that 
an employee is labeled a manager or supervisor is not enough to establish that the 
employee is a managerial agent.  An employee is considered a managerial agent if he or 
                                                          
11  See Ramos v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 784 S.W.2d 67, 669 (Tex. 1990); Albuquerque Concrete v. Pan Am 
Services, 879 P.2d 772, 778 (N.M. 1994). 
12  879 P.2d at 778. 
13  Id. 
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she has the authority to have control, discretion and independent judgment over a certain 
area of the corporation with the power to set policy for the corporation. 
